Abstract. NTRUEncrypt, proposed in 1996 by Hostein, Pipher and Silverman, is the fastest known lattice-based encryption scheme. Its moderate key-sizes, excellent asymptotic performance and conjectured resistance to quantum computers could make it a desirable alternative to factorisation and discrete-log based encryption schemes. However, since its introduction, doubts have regularly arisen on its security. In the present work, we show how to modify NTRUEncrypt to make it provably secure in the standard model, under the assumed quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to a family of lattices related to some cyclotomic elds. Our main contribution is to show that if the secret key polynomials are selected by rejection from discrete Gaussians, then the public key, which is their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform over its domain. The security then follows from the already proven hardness of the R-LWE problem.
Introduction
NTRUEncrypt, devised by Hostein, Pipher and Silverman, was rst presented at the Crypto'96 rump session [14] . Although its description relies on arithmetic over the polynomial ring Z q [x]/(x n − 1) for n prime and q a small integer, it was quickly observed that breaking it could be expressed as a problem over Euclidean lattices [6] . At the ANTS'98 conference, the NTRU authors gave an improved presentation including a thorough assessment of its practical security against lattice attacks [15] . We refer to [13] for an up-to-date account on the past 15 years of security and performance analyses. Nowadays, NTRUEncrypt is generally considered as a reasonable alternative to the encryption schemes based on integer factorisation and discrete logarithm over nite elds and elliptic curves, as testied by its inclusion in the IEEE P1363 standard [18] . It is also often considered as the most viable post-quantum public-key encryption (see, e.g., [31] ).
that our main goal in this paper is to provide a rm theoretical grounding for the security of NTRUEncrypt in the asymptotic sense. We leave to future work the consideration of practical issues, in particular the selection of concrete parameters for given security levels. As for other lattice-based schemes, the latter requires evaluation of security against practical lattice reduction attacks, which is out of the scope of the current work.
Our main contribution is the modication and analysis of the key generation algorithm. The secret key consists of two sparse polynomials of degrees < n and coecients of magnitude at most c, for a small constant c (typically, c ∈ {2, 3}). The public key is their quotient in Z q [x] /(x n − 1) (the denominator is resampled if it is not invertible). A simple information-theoretic argument shows that the public key cannot be uniformly distributed in the whole ring. It may be possible to extend the results of [4] to show that it is well-spread in the ring, but it still would not suce for showing its cryptographic pseudorandomness, which seems necessary for exploiting the established hardness of R-LWE. To achieve a public key distribution statistically close to uniform, we sample the secret key polynomials according to a discrete Gaussian with standard deviation ≈ q 1/2 . An essential ingredient, which could be of independent interest, is a new regularity result for the ring R q := Z q [x]/(x n + 1) when the polynomial x n + 1 (with n a power of 2) has n factors modulo prime q: given a 1 , . . . , a m uniform in R q , we would like i≤m s i a i to be within exponentially small statistical distance to uniformity, with small random s i 's and small m. Note that a similar regularity bound can be obtained with an FFT-based technique recently developed by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [22] . An additional diculty in the public-keỳ uniformity' proof, which we handle via an inclusion-exclusion argument, is that we need the s i 's to be invertible in R q (the denominator of the public key is one such s i ): we thus sample according to a discrete Gaussian, and reject the sample if it is not invertible.
Brief comparison of NTRUEncrypt and its provably secure variant
Let R NTRU be the ring Z[x]/(x n −1) with n prime. Let q be a medium-size integer (typically, either a prime or a power of 2 of the same order of magnitude as n). Finally, let p ∈ R NTRU with small coecients, co-prime with q and such that the plaintext space R NTRU /p is large (typically, one may take p ∈ {2, 3} or p = x+2).
The NTRUEncrypt secret key is a pair of polynomials (f, g) ∈ R 2 NTRU that are sampled randomly with large prescribed proportions of zeros, and with their other coecients having small magnitude. For improved decryption eciency, one may choose f such that f = 1 mod p (a typical choice [17] is to choose g and F with coecients in {0, 1} and set f = 1 + p · F ). With high probability, the polynomial f is invertible modulo q and modulo p, and if that is the case, the public-key is h = pg/f mod q (otherwise, the key generation process is restarted). To encrypt a message M ∈ R NTRU /p, one samples a random element s ∈ R NTRU of small Euclidean norm and computes the ciphertext C = hs + M mod q. The following procedure allows the owner of the secret key to decrypt:
• Compute f C mod q. If C was properly generated, this gives pgs + f M mod q. Since p, g, s, f, M have small coecients, it can be expected that after reduction modulo q the obtained representative is pgs + f M (in R NTRU ).
• Reduce the latter modulo p. This should provide f M mod p.
• Multiply the result of the previous step by the inverse of f modulo p (this step becomes vacuous if f = 1 mod p).
Note that the encryption process is probabilistic, and that decryption errors can occur for some sets of parameters. However, it is possible to arbitrarily decrease the decryption error probability, and even to eliminate it completely.
In order to achieve CPA-security we make a few modications to the original NTRUEncrypt (which preserve its quasi-linear time and space complexity):
1. We replace R NTRU by R = Z[x]/(x n + 1) with n a power of 2. We will exploit the irreducibility of x n + 1 and the fact that R is the ring of integers of a cyclotomic number eld. 2. We choose a prime q ≤ Poly(n) such that f = x n + 1 mod q has n distinct linear factors (i.e., q = 1 mod 2n). This allows us to use the search to decision reduction for R-LWE with ring R q := R/q (see [21] ), and also to take p = 2. 3. We sample f and g from discrete Gaussians over R, rejecting the samples that are not invertible in R q . We show that f /g mod q is essentially uniformly distributed over the set of invertible elements of R q . We may also choose f = pf + 1 with f sampled from a discrete Gaussian, to simplify decryption. 4. We add a small error term e in the encryption: C = hs + pe + M mod q, with s and e sampled from the R-LWE error distribution. This allows us to derive CPA security from the hardness of a variant of R-LWE (which is similar to the variant of LWE from [3, Se. 3.1]).
Work in progress and open problems
Our study is restricted to the sequence of rings Z[x]/Φ n with Φ n = x n + 1 with n a power of 2. An obvious drawback is that this does not allow for much exibility on the choice of n (in the case of NTRU, the degree was assumed prime, which provides more freedom). The R-LWE problem is known to be hard when Φ n is cyclotomic [21] . We chose to restrict ourselves to cyclotomic polynomials of order a power of 2 because it makes the error generation of R-LWE more ecient, and the description of the schemes simpler to follow. Our results are likely to hold for more general rings than those we considered. An interesting choice could be the cyclotomic rings of prime order (i.e., Φ n = (x n − 1)/(x − 1) with n prime) as these are large subrings of the NTRU rings (and one might then be able to show that the hardness carries over to the NTRU rings).
An interesting open problem is to obtain a CCA secure variant of our scheme in the standard model, while maintaining its eciency (within constant factors). The selection of concrete parameters based on practical security estimates for the worst-case SVP in ideal lattices or the average-case hardness of R-LWE/Ideal-SIS is also left as a future work.
The authors of NTRUEncrypt also proposed a signature scheme based on a similar design. The history of NTRUSign started with NSS in 2001 [16] . Its development has been signicantly more hectic and controversial, with a series of cryptanalyses and repairs (see the survey [13] ). In a work in progress, we construct a variant of NTRUSign with unforgeability related to the worst-case hardness of standard problems over ideal lattices, in the random oracle model. Our construction modies the NTRUSign key generation and adapts the GPV signature scheme [11] to this setting.
Like NTRUEncrypt, Gentry's somewhat homomorphic scheme [9] also has ciphertexts consisting of a single ring element. It also admits a security proof under the assumed quantum hardness of standard worst-case problems over ideal lattices [10] . Our security analysis for the modied NTRUEncrypt scheme allows encrypting and decrypting Ω(n) plaintext bits for O(n) bit operations, while achieving security against 2 g(n) -time attacks, for any g(n) that is Ω(log n) and o(n), assuming the worst-case hardness of Poly(n)-Ideal-SVP against 2 O(g(n)) -time quantum algorithms. The latter assumption is believed to be valid for any g(n) = o(n). Gentry's analysis from [10, 8] 
) -time quantum algorithms. The latter assumption is known to be invalid when g(n) = Ω( √ n) (using [34] ), thus limiting the attacker's strength the analysis can handle. On the other hand, Gentry's scheme allows homomorphic additions and multiplications, whereas ours seems restricted to additions. Our scheme and Gentry's seem to be closely related, and we leave to future work the further investigation of this relation.
Notation. We denote by ρ σ (x) (resp. ν σ ) the standard n-dimensional Gaussian function (resp. distribution) with center 0 and variance σ, i.e., ρ σ (x) = exp(−π x 2 /σ 2 ) (resp. ν σ (x) = ρ σ (x)/σ n ). We denote by Exp(µ) the exponential distribution on R with mean µ and by U (E) the uniform distribution over a nite set E . If D 1 and D 2 are two distributions on discrete domain E, their statistical distance is ∆(
We write z ← D when the random variable z is sampled from the distribution D.
A Few Background Results
A (full-rank) lattice is a set of the form L = i≤n Zb i , where the b i 's are linearly independent vectors in R n . The integer n is called the lattice dimension, and the
For a lattice L ⊆ R n , σ > 0 and c ∈ R n , we dene the lattice Gaussian distribution of support L, deviation σ and center c by
We will omit the subscript c when it is 0. We extend the denition of 
Lemma 5 ([11, Th. 4.1]). There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input any basis
, and returns samples from a distribution whose statistical distance to D L,σ is negligible (resp. exponentially small) with respect to n.
The most famous lattice problem is SVP. Given a basis of a lattice L, it aims at nding a shortest vector in L \ 0. It can be relaxed to γ-SVP by asking for a non-zero vector that is no longer than γ(n) times a solution to SVP, for a prescribed function γ(·). It is believed that no subexponential quantum algorithm solves the computational variants of γ-SVP in the worst case, for any γ ≤ Poly(n). The smallest γ which is known to be achievable in polynomial time is exponential, up to poly-logarithmic factors in the exponent ( [34, 26] ).
Ideal lattices and algebraic number theory
Ideal lattices. Let n a power of 2 and Φ = x n + 1 (which is irreducible over Q). Let R be the ring Z[x]/Φ. An (integral) ideal I of R is a subset of R closed under addition and multiplication by arbitrary elements of R. By mapping polynomials to the vectors of their coecients, we see that an ideal I = 0 corresponds to a full-rank sublattice of Z n : we can thus view I as both a lattice and an ideal. An ideal lattice for Φ is a sublattice of Z n that corresponds to a non-zero ideal I ⊆ R. The algebraic norm N (I) is the cardinality of the additive group R/I. It is equal to det I, where I is regarded as a lattice. Any non-zero ideal I of R satises λ n (I) = λ 1 (I). In the following, an ideal lattice will implicitly refer to a Φ-ideal lattice.
By restricting SVP (resp. γ-SVP) to instances that are ideal lattices, we obtain Ideal-SVP (resp. γ-Ideal-SVP). The latter is implicitly parameterized by the sequence of polynomials Φ n = x n + 1, where n is restricted to powers of 2. No algorithm is known to perform non-negligibly better for (γ-)Ideal-SVP than for (γ-)SVP.
Properties of the ring R. For v ∈ R we denote by v its Euclidean norm (as a vector). We dene the multiplicative expansion factor
Since Φ is the 2n-th cyclotomic polynomial, the ring R is exactly the maximal order (i.e., the ring of integers) of the cyclotomic eld
where ζ ∈ C is a primitive 2n-th root of unity. We denote by (σ i ) i≤n the canonical complex embeddings: We can choose σ i :
Also, for the particular cyclotomic elds we are considering, the polynomial norm (the norm of the coecient vector of α when expressed as an element of
We also use the fact that for any α ∈ R, we have |N (α)| = det α , where α is the ideal of R generated by α. For simplicity, we will try to use the polynomial terminology wherever possible.
Let q be a prime number such that Φ has n distinct linear factors modulo q (i.e., q = 1 mod 2n):
Dirichlet's theorem on arithmetic progressions implies that innitely such primes exist. Furthermore, Linnik's theorem asserts that the smallest such q is Poly(n), and much eort has been spent to decrease this bound (the current record seems to be O(n 5.2 ), see [36] ). Furthermore, we can write φ i as r i , where r is a primitive (2n)-th root of unity modulo q. This implies that the Chinese Remainder Theorem in R q provides a natural fast Discrete Fourier Transform, and thus multiplication of elements of R q can be performed within O(n log n) additions and multiplications modulo q (see [7, Ch. 8 The R-LWE problem For s ∈ R q and ψ a distribution in R q , we dene A s,ψ as the distribution obtained by sampling the pair (a, as+e) with (a, e) ← U (R q )×ψ. The Ring Learning With Errors problem (R-LWE) was introduced by Lyubashevsky et al. [21] and shown hard for specic error distributions ψ. These are slightly technical to dene (see below), but for the present work, the important facts to be remembered are that the samples are small (see Lemma 6) , and can be obtained in quasi-linear time.
The error distributions ψ that we use are an adaptation of those introduced in [21] . They are sampled from a family of distributions Υ α that we now dene. For σ ∈ R n with positive coordinates, we dene the ellipsoidal Gaussian ρ σ as the row vector of independent Gaussians (ρ σ1 , . . . , ρ σn ), where σ i = σ i+n/2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2. As we want to dene R-LWE in the polynomial expression of R rather than with the so-called space H of [21] , we apply a matrix transformation to the latter Gaussians. We dene a sample from ρ σ as a sample from ρ σ , multiplied rst (from the right) by
⊗Id n/2 ∈ C n×n , and sec-
. Note that vector multiplication by matrix V corresponds to a complex discrete Fourier transform, and can be performed in O(n log n) complex-valued arithmetic operations with the Cooley-Tukey FFT. Moreover, it is numerically extremely stable: if all operations are performed with a precision of p = Ω(log n) bits, then the computed output vector f l(y) satises f l(y)−y ≤ C ·(log n)·2
−p · y , where C is some absolute constant and y is the vector that would be obtained with exact computations. We refer to [12, Se. 24 .1] for details. We now dene a sample from ρ σ as follows: compute a sample from ρ σ with absolute error < 1/n 2 ; if it is within distance 1/n 2 of the middle of two consecutive integers, then restart; otherwise, round it to a closest integer and then reduce it modulo q. Finally, a distribution sampled from Υ α for α ≥ 0 is dened as ρ σ , where σ i = α 2 q 2 + x i with the x i 's sampled independently from the distribution Exp(nα 2 q 2 ).
Sampling from ρ σ can be performed in time O(n). Sampling from Υ α can also be performed in expected time O(n), and the running-time is bounded by a quantity that follows a geometric law of parameter < 1. Furthermore, in all our cryptographic applications, one could pre-compute such samples o-line (i.e., before the message M to be processed is known).
Proof. We dene Υ α exactly as Υ α , but without the rejection step from ρ σ to ρ σ . Because of the bound on the rejection probability, it suces to prove the result with
with the x k 's sampled independently from the distribution Exp(nα 2 q 2 ). We have max σ k ≤ αq √ nω( √ log n) with probability 1 − n −ω (1) . We write y = y + η, where the eld element y ∈ K is sampled from ρ σ , and actually derived from a sample z from ρ σ , and η ∈ K is the error in rounding y ∈ K to y ∈ R, with η ∞ ≤ 1/2. Then yr ∞ ≤ y r ∞ + ηr ∞ . Using the Schwartz inequality, the second term can be bounded as ηr ∞ ≤ √ n 2 r . We now bound the rst term. The embedding vector of y has the following shape:
Let (r (k) ) k be the embedding vector of r. Then the embedding vector of y r
The kth summand of the last sum follows a normal law of mean 0 and standard deviation |r (k) |σ k . Therefore, the coecient in x j of yr follows a normal law of standard deviation
αqω(log n) · r with probability 1 − n −ω (1) . Using αq ≥ √ n, we get yr ∞ + ηr ∞ ≤ αqω(log n) · r with probability 1 − n −ω (1) , as claimed.
We now dene our adaptation of R-LWE. −o(n) ) over the randomness of the input, the randomness of the samples and the internal randomness of the algorithm.
The following theorem indicates that R-LWE is hard, assuming that the worst-case γ-Ideal-SVP cannot be eciently solved using quantum computers, for small γ. It was recently improved by Lyubashevsky et al. [22] : if the number of samples that can be asked to the oracle O is bounded by a constant (which is the case in our application), then the result also holds with simpler errors than e ← ψ ← Υ α , and with an even smaller Ideal-SVP approximation factor γ. This should allow to both simplify the modied NTRUEncrypt and to strengthen its security guarantee.
Theorem 1 (Adapted from [21] ). Assume that αq = ω(n √ log n) (resp. Ω(n 1.5 )) with α ∈ (0, 1) and q = Poly(n). There exists a randomized polynomialtime (resp. subexponential) quantum reduction from γ-Ideal-SVP to R-LWE q,α , with γ = ω(n 1.5 log n)/α (resp. Ω(n 2.5 )/α).
The dierences with [21] in the above formulation are the use of the polynomial representation (handled by applying the complex FFT to the error term), the use of R q rather than R ∨ q := R ∨ /q where R ∨ is the codierent (here we
, and the truncation of the error to closest integer if it is far from the middle of two consecutive integers. The new variant remains hard because a sample passes the rejection step with non-negligible probability, and the rounding can be performed on the oracle samples obliviously to the actual error.
Variants of R-LWE. For s ∈ R q and ψ a distribution in R q , we dene A 
New Results on Module q-ary Lattices
In this section, we present strong regularity bounds for the ring R q . For this purpose, we rst study two families of R-modules.
Duality results for some module lattices
Let a ∈ R m q . We dene the following families of R-modules, for I an arbitrary ideal of R q :
We also dene a ⊥ and L(a) as a ⊥ (R q ) and L(a, 0 ) respectively. The ideals of R q are of the form
where S is any subset of {1, . . . , n} (the φ i 's are the roots of Φ modulo q).
. Then (considering both sets as mn-dimensional lattices by identifying R and Z n ):
Proof. We rst prove that 
By denition of the t i 's, there exists s
. We have the following, modulo q:
Both sums in the right hand side evaluate to 0 in R q , which provides the desired inclusion.
To complete the proof, it suces to show that L(a × , I
be seen by considering the elements of L(a × , I S ) corresponding to s = 1.
On the absence of unusually short vectors in L(a, I S )
We show that for a ← U ((R × q ) m ), the lattice L(a, I S ) is extremely unlikely to contain unusually short vectors for the innity norm, i.e., much shorter than guaranteed by the Minkowski upper bound det(L(a, I S )) 
except with probability ≤ 2 n (q − 1) −εn over the uniformly random choice of a
Proof. Recall that Φ = i≤n Φ i for distinct linear factors Φ i . By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we know that R q (resp. R
Let p denote the probability (over the randomness of a) that L(a, I S ) contains a non-zero vector t of innity norm < B, where B = 
So far, we have showed that the probability p can be upper bounded by: N (B, d) denote the number of t ∈ R q such that t ∞ < B and t = ht for some t ∈ R q of degree < n − d. We consider two bounds for N (B, d) depending on d.
Suppose that d ≥ β · n. Then we claim that N (B, d) = 0. Indeed, any t = ht for some t ∈ R q belongs to the ideal h, q of R generated by h and q. For any non-zero t ∈ h, q , we have
where the inequality is because the ideal t is a full-rank sub-ideal of h, q , and the last equality is because deg h = d. It follows from the arithmetic-geometric inequality
By equivalence of norms, we conclude
Indeed, since the degree of h is d, the vector t formed by the n − d low-order coecients of t is related to the vector t formed by the n − d low-order coecients of t by a lower triangular (n − d) × (n − d) matrix whose diagonal coecients are equal to 1. Hence this matrix is non-singular modulo q so the mapping from t to t is one-to-one. This provides the claim.
Using the above bounds on N (B, d) , the fact that the number of subsets of S of cardinality d is ≤ 2 d , and the fact that the number of s ∈ R q /I S divisible by h = i∈S Φ i is q |S|−d , the above bound on p implies
With our choice of B, we have 2B ≤ (q − 1) β (this is implied by n ≥ 8, q ≥ 5 and β ≤ 1). A straightforward computation then leads to the claimed upper bound on p.
Improved regularity bounds
We now study the uniformity of distribution of (m+1)-tuples from (R × q ) m ×R q of the form (a 1 , . . . , a m , i≤m t i a i ) , where the a i 's are independent and uniformly random in R × q , and the t i 's are chosen from some distribution on R q concentrated on elements with small coecients. Similarly to [23] , we call the distance of the latter distribution to the uniform distribution on (R × q ) m ×R q the regularity of the generalized knapsack function (t i ) i≤m → i≤m t i a i . For our NTRU application we are particularly interested in the case where m = 2.
The regularity result in [23, Se. 4.1] applies when the a i 's are uniformly random in the whole ring R q , and the t i 's are uniformly random on the subset of elements of R q with coecients of magnitude ≤ d for some d < q. In this case, the regularity bound from [23] is Ω( nq/d m ). Unfortunately, this bound is non-negligible for small m and q, e.g., for m = O(1) and q = Poly(n). To make it exponentially small in n, one needs to set m log d = Ω(n), which inevitably leads to inecient cryptographic functions. When the a i 's are chosen uniformly from the whole ring R q , the actual regularity is not much better than this undesirable regularity bound. This is because R q contains n proper ideals of size q n−1 = |R q |/q, and the probability ≈ n/q m that all of the a i 's fall into one such ideal (which causes t i a i to also be trapped in the proper ideal) is non-negligible for small m. To circumvent this problem, we restrict the a i 's to be uniform in R × q , and we choose the t i 's from a discrete Gaussian distribution. We show a regularity bound exponentially small in n even for m = O(1), by using an argument similar to that used in [11, Se. 5.1] for unstructured generalized knapsacks, based on the smoothing parameter of the underlying lattices. Note that the new regularity result can be used within the Ideal-SIS trapdoor generation of [35, Se. 3] , thus extending the latter to a fully splitting q. It also shows that the encryption scheme from [21] can be shown secure against subexponential (quantum) attackers, assuming the subexponential (quantum) hardness of standard worst-case problems over ideal lattices.
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 8 be a power of 2 such that Φ = x n + 1 splits into n linear factors modulo prime
m +ε , and the distance to uniformity of i≤m t i a i is ≤ 2δ. As a consequence:
When using this result, one is typically interested in taking a small constant ε > 0, because it allows to lower the standard deviation σ and thus the required amount of randomness. Then a tiny δ should be chosen (e.g., δ ≈ 2 n (q − 1) −εn ), as it drastically lowers the statistical distance upper bound, without strengthening the standard deviation requirement much.
For each a ∈ (R × q ) m , let D a denote the distribution of i≤m t i a i where t is sampled from D Z mn ,σ . Note that the above statistical distance is exactly
where ∆ a is the distance to uniformity of D a . To prove the theorem, it therefore suces to show a distance bound ∆ a ≤ 2δ, for all except a fraction ≤ 2
m . Now, the mapping t → i t i a i induces an isomorphism from the quotient group Z mn /a ⊥ to its range (note that a ⊥ is the kernel of t → i t i a i ). The latter is R q , thanks to the invertibility of the a i 's. Therefore, the statistical distance ∆ a is equal to the distance to uniformity of t mod a ⊥ . By Lemma 4, we have ∆ a ≤ 2δ if σ is greater than the smoothing parameter η δ (a ⊥ ) of a ⊥ ⊆ Z mn . To upper bound η δ (a ⊥ ), we apply Lemma 2, which reduces the task to lower bounding the minimum of the dual lattice
is in one-to-one correspondence with a.
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemmata 2, 4, 7 and 8. Theorem 2 follows by taking S = ∅ and c = 0.
Lemma 9. Let n ≥ 8 be a power of 2 such that Φ = x n + 1 splits into n linear factors modulo prime q ≥ 5. Let S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, m ≥ 2, ε > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2), c ∈ R mn and t ← D Z mn ,σ,c , with
Then for all except a fraction ≤ 2
A revised key generation algorithm
We now use the results of the previous section on modular q-ary lattices to derive a key generation algorithm for NTRUEncrypt, where the generated public key follows a distribution for which Ideal-SVP reduces to R-LWE.
NTRUEncrypt's key generation algorithm
The new key generation algorithm for NTRUEncrypt is given in Fig. 1 . The secret key polynomials f and g are generated by using the Gentry et al. sampler of discrete Gaussians (see Lemma 5) , and by rejecting so that the output polynomials are invertible modulo q. The Gentry et al. sampler may not exactly sample from discrete Gaussians, but since the statistical distance can be made exponentially small, the impact on our results is also exponentially small. Furthermore, it can be checked that our conditions on standard deviations are much stronger than the one in Lemma 5. From now on, we will assume we have a perfect discrete Gaussian sampler. By choosing a large enough standard deviation σ, we can apply the results of the previous section and obtain the (quasi-)uniformity of the public key. We sample f of the form p · f + 1 so that it has inverse 1 modulo p, making the decryption process of NTRUEncrypt more ecient (as in the original NTRUEncrypt scheme). We remark that the rejection condition on f at Step 1 is equivalent to
The following result ensures that for some appropriate choice of parameters, the key generation algorithm terminates in expected polynomial time.
Lemma 10. Let n ≥ 8 be a power of 2 such that Φ = x n + 1 splits into n linear factors modulo prime q ≥ 5. Let σ ≥ n ln(2n(1 + 1/δ))/π · q 1/n , for an arbi- Proof. We are to bound the probability that p · f + a belongs to I := q, Φ k by 1/q + 2δ, for any k ≤ n. The result then follows from the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the union bound. We have N (I) = q, so that λ 1 (I) ≤ √ nq 1/n , by Minkowski's theorem. Since I is an ideal of R, we have λ n (I) = λ 1 (I), and Lemma 1 gives that σ ≥ η δ (I). Lemma 4 then shows that f mod I is within distance ≤ 2δ to uniformity on R/I, so we have p · f + a = 0 mod I (or, equivalently, f = −a/p mod I) with probability ≤ 1/q + 2δ, as required.
As a consequence of the above bound on the rejection probability, we have the following result, which ensures that the generated secret key is small. Lemma 11. Let n ≥ 8 be a power of 2 such that Φ = x n + 1 splits into n linear factors modulo prime q ≥ 8n. Let σ ≥ 2n ln(6n)/π ·q 1/n .The secret key polynomials f, g returned by the algorithm of Fig. 1 satisfy, with probability ≥ 1−2 −n+3 :
Proof. The probability under scope is lower than the probability of the same event without rejection, divided by the rejection probability. The result follows by combining Lemmata 3 and 10.
Public key uniformity
In the algorithm of Fig. 1 , the polynomials f and g are independently sampled from the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z n ,σ with σ ≥ Poly(n) · q 1/2+ε for an arbitrary ε > 0, but restricted (by rejection) to R 
q . This directly gives the claimed bound. The fraction of a ∈ R × q such that |P r a − (q − 1)
−n | ≤ ε is equal to the fraction of a = (a 1 , a 2 
and hence the set of solutions (f 1 , f 2 ) ∈ R to the latter equation is z + a ⊥× , where
.
We now use the fact that for any t ∈ a ⊥ we have t 2 = −t 1 a 1 /a 2 so, since −a 1 /a 2 ∈ R × q , the ring elements t 1 and t 2 must belong to the same ideal I S of R q for some S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. It follows that a
Using the inclusionexclusion principle, we obtain:
In the rest of the proof, we show that, except for a fraction ≤ 2
where |δ i | ≤ 2 2n+2 q − εn for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The bound on |P r a −(q −1) −n | follows by a routine computation.
Handling (1) . We note that, since z ∈ Z 2n , we have (for any S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}):
For the terms of (1) with |S| ≤ εn, we apply Lemma 9 with m = 2. Since |S|/n + ε ≤ 2ε, the Lemma 9 assumption on σ holds, with δ : Handling (2) . For the bounds on δ 1 and δ 2 , we use a similar argument. Let i ∈ {1, 2}. The z i term can be handled like like the z term of (1). We observe that for any S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we have det(I S + qZ n ) = q |S| and hence, by Minkowski's theorem, λ 1 (I S + qZ n ) ≤ √ n · q |S|/n . Moreover, since I S + qZ n is an ideal lattice, we have λ n (I S + qZ n ) = λ 1 (I S + qZ n ) ≤ √ n · q |S|/n . Lemma 1 gives that σ ≥ η δ (I S + qZ n ) for any S such that |S| ≤ n/2, with δ := q −n/2 . Therefore, by Lemma 4, for such an S, we have |D Z n ,σ,−z i (I S + qZ n ) − q −|S| | ≤ 2δ. For a term of (2) with |S| > n/2, we choose S ⊆ S with |S | = n/2. By using with S the above result for small |S|, we obtain D Z n ,σ,−zi (I S + qZ n ) ≤ D Z n ,σ,−z i (I S + qZ n ) ≤ 2δ + q −n/2 . Overall, we have:
which leads to the desired bound on δ i (using ε < 1/2). This completes the proof of the theorem.
NTRUEncrypt Revisited
Using our new results above, we describe a modication of NTRUEncrypt for which we can provide a security proof under a worst-case hardness assumption. We use Φ = x n + 1 with n ≥ 8 a power of 2, R = Z[x]/Φ and R q = R/qR with q ≥ 5 prime such that Φ = n k=1 Φ k in R q with distinct Φ k 's. We dene our modied NTRUEncrypt scheme with parameters n, q, p, α, σ as follows. The parameters n and q dene the rings R and R q . The parameter p ∈ R × q denes the plaintext message space as P = R/pR. It must be a polynomial with`small' coecients with respect to q, but at the same time we require N (p) = |P| = 2 Ω(n) so that many bits can be encoded at once. Typical choices as used in the original NTRUEncrypt scheme are p = 3 and p = x + 2, but in our case, since q is prime, we may also choose p = 2. By reducing modulo the px i 's, we can write any element of p as 0≤i<n ε i x i p, with ε i ∈ (−1/2, 1/2]. Using the fact that R = Z[x]/(x n + 1), we can thus assume that any element of P is an element of R with innity norm ≤ (deg(p)+1)· p . The parameter α is the R-LWE noise distribution parameter. Finally, the parameter σ is the standard deviation of the discrete Gaussian distribution used in the key generation process (see Section 4).
• Key generation. Use the algorithm of Fig. 1 and return sk = f ∈ R × q with f = 1 mod p, and pk = h = pg/f ∈ R × q .
• Encryption. Given message M ∈ P, set s, e ← Υ α and return ciphertext C = hs + pe + M ∈ R q .
• Decryption. Given ciphertext C and secret key f , compute C = f · C ∈ Rq and return C mod p. The correctness conditions for the scheme are summarized below.
Lemma 12. If ω(n 1.5 log n)α deg(p) p 2 σ < 1 (resp. ω(n 0.5 log n)α p 2 σ < 1 if deg p ≤ 1) and αq ≥ n 0.5 , then the decryption algorithm of NTRUEncrypt recovers M with probability 1 − n −ω (1) over the choice of s, e, f, g.
